So much has happened...so much to come
On the side of the entrance to the maternity ward at the camp yesterday was plastered a bumper sticker advertising a radio program airing from "the heart of darfur".
I haven't explored it extensively, but it seems to document what is going on at the local level as well as the broader political happenings.
www.radiodabanga.org
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Saturday, December 5, 2009
This photo was taken inside the vehicle waiting for the convoy to leave Bredjing camp. The population of Bredjing camp is over 30,000. They have been displaced for upwards of five years now.
The issue of humanitarian organizations taking armed convoys is an especially hot topic these days. The government has told all NGOs that they require our vehicles to be escourted by the armed police, who are supported with funding through the UN. The premise for the requirement is security concerns. The NGO community has been largely passive about this demand, yet armed escorts are extremely problematic as they violate humanitarian principles.
The escorts have neither prevented attacks nor have they been capable of responding to attacks. In Bahai this summer, one of our vehicles was highjacked in the middle of the day traveling in an armed convoy. The police were powerless to respond, they literally sat and watched while the vehicle was taken. Yet we continue to use them...
Saturday, November 21, 2009
When two elephants fight, it is the grass that is injured
The refugee camp near Bahai, called Oure Cassoni, is comprised of an estimated 90% women and children. This camp, which I described previously as a rebel stronghold, has been ordered to be relocated by the government. Although the current location does not meet international standards because of its proximity to the border and the presence of armed groups, the move is not a humanitarian decision; it is a political decision. As I mentioned before, the government has built up a town (the president’s hometown) near the new location anticipating the economic boost and has plans to use the current location as a military base to fortify their presence in eastern Chad.
It has just been confirmed by NGO engineers that the location which the government has designated for the new site does not have enough water to support the estimated 30,000 people. It is now the government’s decision as to how to proceed…whether they look elsewhere or decide to truck in water. The problem of inadequate water exemplifies the humanitarian community’s concern of the new location. It is located on the same latitude further inland, thus inhospitable to any agriculture or means of livelihood. Consequently, there is no exit strategy for humanitarian relief because the population will continue to be entirely dependent on aid.
The process thus far has lacked any transparency. UNHCR has yet to detail who they expect to run various camp functions (i.e. camp management, health, water and sanitation, etc). As difficult as it is for an NGO to plan programs in this context, the larger dilemma is the lack of communication between UNHCR and the refugee population. They have made the announcement but given no further information. The refugees have not been consulted and are, understandably, angry that they will have to move again. Many are saying they will risk the return to Sudan to become internally displaced rather than move further into Chad. The international community currently has no estimation of what percentage will move to the new location and how many will return to Darfur.
Calculating the number of refugees in a given camp is never accurate and is almost always inflated. Because population numbers (and number of family members at the individual level) affects the amount of food aid distributed, refugees find ways to register multiple times, inflate the number of family members they have, and are very reluctant to allow a death to be registered. So it is unlikely that there are actually 30,000 people in the camp now, but the international community must base their planning on this number regardless.
Protection is the official reason the government has cited for the camp’s impending relocation. Although, this is largely a convenient excuse for the government, there does exist numerous protection concerns. Of course, the presence of armed forces in a camp comprised of 90% women and children negates any meaningful efforts at protection. Beyond the obvious, the protection issue has several different aspects in this context.
When the camp is forced to move, the remaining structures pose a protection issue. It is possible that either the government or NGO community will be tasked with bull-dozing the site, as happened in Uganda, to ensure the remaining camp cannot be used for military purposes. This will force refugees to leave, regardless of their will.
Another protection issue is the occurrence of gender based violence (GBV). Rape, forced early marriage, and genital mutilation are believed to be widely prevalent in the camp, though the current monitoring system is inadequate at capturing cases. Genital mutilation is especially taboo.
One case that recently was up for referral in the Bahai hospital was a young girl who had refused her mother’s demand to marry. Her mother apparently tied her up and had a group of young men come beat her. She stayed there for two weeks before she was taken to the hospital. It is difficult to make sense of such actions…I suppose it demonstrates that so much of our behavior is learned.
The chaining of women is especially common here. Our protection team often sees cases of men chaining women by the wrists and ankles to a round cement stone in such a way that women must remain hunched over. The protection team says that women themselves will say it is their husband’s right to physically abuse them. Of course, women do all the work of the household from construction to cooking and collecting firewood, but because men have multiple wives leaving one chained up for days doesn’t mean they will be inconvenienced.
One common scenario is kidnap, rape, and forced marriage. Because the dowry system still governs the tradition of marriage, men have found a way to avoid the cost of taking a bride by kidnapping girls and then raping them. The traditional means of resolving a case of rape is for the families to come together and force the girl to marry the man who raped her. It is believed the girl will not have marriage prospects after she is raped and so must join the rapist’s family.
According to our best estimation, 80% of girls who are victims of forced early marriage result in cases of fistula.
It has just been confirmed by NGO engineers that the location which the government has designated for the new site does not have enough water to support the estimated 30,000 people. It is now the government’s decision as to how to proceed…whether they look elsewhere or decide to truck in water. The problem of inadequate water exemplifies the humanitarian community’s concern of the new location. It is located on the same latitude further inland, thus inhospitable to any agriculture or means of livelihood. Consequently, there is no exit strategy for humanitarian relief because the population will continue to be entirely dependent on aid.
The process thus far has lacked any transparency. UNHCR has yet to detail who they expect to run various camp functions (i.e. camp management, health, water and sanitation, etc). As difficult as it is for an NGO to plan programs in this context, the larger dilemma is the lack of communication between UNHCR and the refugee population. They have made the announcement but given no further information. The refugees have not been consulted and are, understandably, angry that they will have to move again. Many are saying they will risk the return to Sudan to become internally displaced rather than move further into Chad. The international community currently has no estimation of what percentage will move to the new location and how many will return to Darfur.
Calculating the number of refugees in a given camp is never accurate and is almost always inflated. Because population numbers (and number of family members at the individual level) affects the amount of food aid distributed, refugees find ways to register multiple times, inflate the number of family members they have, and are very reluctant to allow a death to be registered. So it is unlikely that there are actually 30,000 people in the camp now, but the international community must base their planning on this number regardless.
Protection is the official reason the government has cited for the camp’s impending relocation. Although, this is largely a convenient excuse for the government, there does exist numerous protection concerns. Of course, the presence of armed forces in a camp comprised of 90% women and children negates any meaningful efforts at protection. Beyond the obvious, the protection issue has several different aspects in this context.
When the camp is forced to move, the remaining structures pose a protection issue. It is possible that either the government or NGO community will be tasked with bull-dozing the site, as happened in Uganda, to ensure the remaining camp cannot be used for military purposes. This will force refugees to leave, regardless of their will.
Another protection issue is the occurrence of gender based violence (GBV). Rape, forced early marriage, and genital mutilation are believed to be widely prevalent in the camp, though the current monitoring system is inadequate at capturing cases. Genital mutilation is especially taboo.
One case that recently was up for referral in the Bahai hospital was a young girl who had refused her mother’s demand to marry. Her mother apparently tied her up and had a group of young men come beat her. She stayed there for two weeks before she was taken to the hospital. It is difficult to make sense of such actions…I suppose it demonstrates that so much of our behavior is learned.
The chaining of women is especially common here. Our protection team often sees cases of men chaining women by the wrists and ankles to a round cement stone in such a way that women must remain hunched over. The protection team says that women themselves will say it is their husband’s right to physically abuse them. Of course, women do all the work of the household from construction to cooking and collecting firewood, but because men have multiple wives leaving one chained up for days doesn’t mean they will be inconvenienced.
One common scenario is kidnap, rape, and forced marriage. Because the dowry system still governs the tradition of marriage, men have found a way to avoid the cost of taking a bride by kidnapping girls and then raping them. The traditional means of resolving a case of rape is for the families to come together and force the girl to marry the man who raped her. It is believed the girl will not have marriage prospects after she is raped and so must join the rapist’s family.
According to our best estimation, 80% of girls who are victims of forced early marriage result in cases of fistula.
Saturday, November 14, 2009
"Our lifespan is too short to become doctors"
Chad is one of the 10 poorest countries in the world. For this year, it ranks 175 of 182 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI), which ranks according to a range of factors from the macroeconomics of a country to the literacy rate and various health indicators.
The adult illiteracy rate in Chad is about 74%.
If you are Chadian, you are not likely to reach your 51st birthday.
Infant mortality is 124/1,000 live births. Child mortality (under five years of age) is 209/1,000 live births. Maternal mortality is 1,500/100,000 live births. The doctor to person ratio is estimated to be 1 doctor to 30,000 people in Chad.
Compare these statistics to those of the United States, which ranks 13 on the HDI.
Life expectancy is 79 years, infant mortality is 7/1,000 live births, and maternal mortality is 11/100,000 live births.
The adult illiteracy rate in Chad is about 74%.
If you are Chadian, you are not likely to reach your 51st birthday.
Infant mortality is 124/1,000 live births. Child mortality (under five years of age) is 209/1,000 live births. Maternal mortality is 1,500/100,000 live births. The doctor to person ratio is estimated to be 1 doctor to 30,000 people in Chad.
Compare these statistics to those of the United States, which ranks 13 on the HDI.
Life expectancy is 79 years, infant mortality is 7/1,000 live births, and maternal mortality is 11/100,000 live births.
Saturday, August 29, 2009
Looks a lot like this...
The larger context of Chad is best understood as a proxy war with Sudan. Each government is basically supporting the other's rebels. The two main rebel factions of Sudan are JEM and SLA, both of which are present in eastern Chad. JEM more in the north and SLA more in the south. The chadian president is of the Zaghawa tribe, whith whom JEM identifies, for our work this has significant implications.
We provide services in two refugee camps in the east (there are 12 refugee camps in total-about 250,000 people-in the east and many more IDP camps, which are not supported by UNHCR and thus are in very poor condition with the majority of IDPs several times displaced).
The more southern of the camps is Hadjir Hadid/Bredjig. This camp is a pretty conventional set up but has a difficult relationship with the local authority there. This is where the director of Save the Children was assasinated last year-the incident assumed to be related to this guy. But the camp doesn't play into the larger context of the war.
The more northern camp is Bahai/Oure Cassoni. This camp is a stronghold of JEM meaning they have complete power in the camp; child soldiers are being recruited; and the market in the camp had to be closed recently because arms were being sold, whilst NGO's were running protection programs nonetheless!
The chadian president, Idriss Deby, strongly supports JEM and is from this general area. This camp is not in accordance with international standards at all, not only from the point of it being militarized but also because it is less than 50 km from the border. The NGOs and UN have been pointing this out to the government from the beginning, when it was meant to be a transitory camp only. The government has not seemed to care, benefitting from the proximity to the border for JEM.
Last month the president spent the holiday in the area, which disrupts things significantly as Chadian soldiers accompany him and tend to wreak havoc on the local population-one large area of town was literally emptied because of fear of rape and assaults. After that visit by the president he ordered the camp be moved.
As to why the change of heart is speculative but one logical reason is that JEM has splintered with some forming an alliance with...Bashir, the Sudanese President, nonetheless This development exemplifies that iconflict is often more about strategy and opportunism than ideology. Because of the splintering, Deby may be looking to fortify Bahai and build a military base to secure the area.
Obviously, NGOs wouldn't stay and there would no longer be a benefit to have the camp there. He has ordered the site be moved about 45 km west of Bahai; more inland which complies with standards, conveniently in the town his mother lives. Apparently, he has built this place up signicantly with american pre-fab housing that stand empty, solar panelling, and the like. When NGO's arrive, the local economy is drastically distorted as price of living becomes exorbitant and resources such as water become strained-which is happening in Abeche now. But since Deby will likely have a hand in who benefits from the boost in commerce it will be convenient for him.
As for repatriation/resettlement, UNHCR wants to start but neither government is willing to talk. Because of the conditions in Darfur and the length of displacement it makes sense to resettle some in Chad, but the sudanese government opposes the idea although they will not accept their return. Consequently, UNHCR is paralyzed. They have gotten donor governments involved (US and Euro) both of whom have excepted a small number (in the hundreds), which is trifling compared to the need (millions) but symbolic.
One sign of progress is the chadian government's recent approval of issuing refugee id cards. This may not seem significant but it is one step in securing their rights and will deter local authorities from arbitrary harrassment.
As for the coup attempt by chadian rebels to overthrow Deby last year, they were able to defeat the chadian army at the border coming into Chad from Darfur and made it all the way to the capital (N'Djamena) where it is believed that french special forces helped to defeat the rebels. As a former French colony, the French continue to have significant power and an interest in chadian political and economic developments.
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